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OPINION* 
______________ 
 
SHWARTZ, Circuit Judge. 
 
Counsel for various plaintiffs and objectors appeal the attorneys’ fee award 
in the National Football League (“NFL”) concussion injury litigation.  For the 
reasons set forth herein, in all but one instance, the District Court’s fee award was 
factually and legally sound and reflected a proper exercise of its discretion.  As a 
result, we will affirm in part and remand in part.     
I 
A 
 “[R]etired professional football players” sued “Defendants NFL and NFL 
Properties, LLC (collectively ‘NFL Defendants’) [for] fail[ing] to take reasonable 
actions to protect players from the chronic risks posed by concussive and sub-
concussive head injuries.”  In re Nat’l Football League Players Concussion Injury 
Litig. (NFL I), 775 F.3d 570, 572 (3d Cir. 2014).   
 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and, pursuant to I.O.P. 
5.7, does not constitute binding precedent. 
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The District Court appointed Christopher Seeger of Seeger Weiss LLP to 
serve as Co-Lead Class Counsel.  Seeger took the lead in managing the case and 
communicating with the Court.  The Court also established an Executive 
Committee to handle the coordination of the proceedings, and a Steering 
Committee, to handle “all necessary pretrial tasks.”  In re Nat’l Football League 
Players Concussion Injury Litig. (NFL II), 821 F.3d 410, 421 (3d Cir. 2016).  In 
addition, the Court appointed a time-and-expense auditor to monitor counsels’ fees 
and expenses.  Thereafter, master complaints were filed to supersede the many 
complaints, and Defendants moved to dismiss.  Id. at 421-22. 
While the motion was pending, the parties participated in a mediation and 
reached a settlement.  Id. at 422.  Class counsel then filed a class action complaint 
and moved for preliminary class certification and approval of the settlement.  Id.  
The Court “denied the motion because it had doubts that the capped fund for 
paying claims would be sufficient.”  Id. at 422-23.  The parties thereafter “reached 
a revised settlement that uncapped the fund for compensating retired players.”  Id. 
at 423.  
Several groups filed objections to the revised settlement, including seven 
former NFL players, known as the Faneca Objectors.  They argued, among other 
things, that the interests of all class members were not adequately represented and 
that the revised settlement would not compensate all afflicted class members.  To 
address these concerns, “[c]lass counsel filed a second motion for preliminary 
class certification,” which was granted, and the District Court “preliminarily 
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approved the settlement, conditionally certified the class, approved classwide 
notice, and scheduled a final fairness hearing.”  Id. (citing In re Nat’l Football 
League Players’ Concussion Injury Litig., 301 F.R.D. 191 (E.D. Pa. 2014)).  The 
Faneca Objectors and others renewed their objections to the settlement, 
complaining about other purported defects in the settlement.      
Thereafter, the District Court held “a day-long fairness hearing and heard 
argument from class counsel, the NFL, and several objectors.”  Id.  The Court 
appointed Faneca Objectors’ counsel to present the objectors’ arguments.  “After 
the hearing, the Court proposed several changes to benefit class members,” which 
the parties adopted, and it thereafter “granted the motion for class certification and 
final approval of the amended settlement[.]”1  Id.  We affirmed.  Id. at 420.   
 
1 In sum, 
 
[t]he settlement has three components: (1) an uncapped Monetary 
Award Fund that provides compensation for retired players who 
submit proof of certain diagnoses; (2) a $75 million Baseline 
Assessment Program that provides eligible retired players with free 
baseline assessment examinations of their objective neurological 
functioning; and (3) a $10 million Education Fund to instruct football 
players about injury prevention. 
  
NFL II, 821 F.3d at 423. 
5 
B   
In addition to benefits to the class, the settlement required Defendants to 
pay class counsel reasonable fees and costs up to $112.5 million.  On behalf of 
counsel, Seeger filed a fee petition seeking the full $112.5 million.2    
The District Court applied the factors set forth in Gunter v. Ridgewood 
Energy Corp., 223 F.3d 190 (3d Cir. 2000), and In re Prudential Insurance Co. of 
America Sales Practice Litigation Agent Actions, 148 F.3d 283 (3d Cir. 1998), 
performed a lodestar cross-check, and awarded $106,817,220.62 in attorneys’ 
fees3 and $5,682,779.38 in costs.  In re Nat’l Football League Players’ Concussion 
Injury Litig., No. 2:12-md-02323-AB, 2018 WL 1635648, at *1, 3-9 (E.D. Pa. 
Apr. 5, 2018).  The fee award amounted to approximately 11% of the then-present 
value of the settlement.  Id. at *1, 3, 7-8.  
To determine how to allocate the award among counsel, the District Court 
ordered Seeger to “submit a detailed submission as a proposal for the allocation of 
lawyers’ fees among class counsel[,] including the precise amounts to be awarded 
along with a justification of those amounts based on an analysis of the work 
 
2 The District Court approved the settlement term that provided for up to a 
5% holdback from each Monetary Award to pay for costs and fees associated with 
implementing the settlement.  The Court acted within its discretion to overrule the 
more than twenty objections to this term, as it provides funds for work on behalf 
of eligible players seeking benefits in the future.  In re Nat’l Football League 
Players’ Concussion Injury Litig.¸No. 2:12-md-023230AB, 2018 WL 1635648, at 
* 2 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 15, 2018). 
3 Rather than adopting the proposed hourly rates for counsel and paralegals, 
the District Court applied a blended billing rate, averaged from rates for partners, 
of counsel attorneys, associates, contract attorneys, and paralegals.     
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performed.”  JA 7920.  Attorneys seeking fees provided Seeger with itemized 
timesheets and declarations, which he used to develop his proposal.  Seeger 
analyzed the records and provided the Court with declarations, which set forth 
each requesting firm’s “common benefit hours and expenses” and described “what 
they did to merit” a fee award.  JA 8228.  He then submitted a proposed allocation 
to the Court.  Numerous declarations were filed in opposition to the proposed 
allocation.  In reply, Seeger explained the process for reviewing time sheets and 
stated that he “provided each firm with an opportunity to justify why any 
challenged time should be deemed ‘common benefit’ time.”  JA 8227.   
After receiving Seeger’s recommendation and the objections, the District 
Court held a hearing.  During the hearing, firms challenging Seeger’s proposed fee 
allocation were each given an opportunity to present oral arguments.  After 
considering the arguments and submissions, the Court issued a detailed opinion 
allocating the attorneys’ fees.4  To calculate the multipliers, the Court considered 
the same factors that Seeger used, namely: (1) the value of the contribution to the 
settlement negotiations and defense of the settlement on appeal, (2) meaningful 
 
4 The relevant allocations are as follows: 
Anapol Weiss............................................................................$4,643,590.00 
Kreindler & Kreindler...............................................................$1,491,097.30 
Locks Law Firm........................................................................$3,855,625.00 
Mitnick Law.................................................................................$673,959.38 
Pope McGlamry...........................................................................$829,030.00 
Seeger Weiss...........................................................................$51,737,185.70 
Zimmerman Reed........................................................................$811,600.87 
Faneca Objectors.........................................................................$350,000.00 
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involvement in the settlement negotiations and defense, and (3) appointment to 
leadership roles in the litigation.5  The Court considered “the legal acumen 
necessary to construct and defend this unique settlement” and whether fee 
applicants were “involved in this litigation from the earliest stages through to the 
hard fought appeal.”  JA 88.  The Court also noted the value of Seeger’s 
recommendation because of his “front row seat for the [settlement] negotiations 
and the legal rigors of the appellate process.”  JA 90.   
Various firms appeal the awards and lodge multiple challenges.  Among 
other things, Appellants claim that the method used to allocate the fees among 
counsel, including Seeger’s recommender role, was improper.  Other Appellants, 
like the Faneca Objectors, object to the specific award that they received. 
II6 
A 
 We have carefully reviewed each argument, the record, the governing law, 
and the District Court’s opinion and, with just one exception, conclude that the 
 
5 The District Court agreed with Seeger that membership on the Steering or 
Executive Committees alone did not warrant a multiplier greater than 1.0.   
6 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2).  
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We review class action fee 
decisions for abuse of discretion.  In re Diet Drugs (Diet Drugs II), 582 F.3d 524, 
538 (3d Cir. 2009).  We give district courts considerable deference in fee 
decisions, see In re AT & T Corp., 455 F.3d 160, 163 (3d Cir. 2006), because “[a] 
judge is presumed knowledgeable as to the fees charged by attorneys in general 
and as to the quality of legal work presented to [her] by particular attorneys,”  
Lindy Bros. Builders, Inc. v. Am. Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 487 F.2d 
161, 169 (3d Cir. 1973).    
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District Court soundly exercised its discretion in its fee awards and procedures 
employed.7  With one exception, the Court provided thorough explanations for 
each of its rulings.  As a result, it is unnecessary for us to dwell on the numerous 
challenges.8  We do, however, briefly address one issue that many Appellants have 
raised concerning the Court’s use of Seeger to make recommendations about the 
allocation.  We also explain why remand is necessary for one of the fee awards.   
B 
We first consider whether it was proper for the District Court to permit 
Seeger to make a recommendation to the Court regarding how to allocate the more 
than $100 million in fees to himself and all other counsel.   
 
7 In fact, given the thorough consideration the District Court gave to each 
fee application, “[w]e can hardly think of a sphere of judicial decisionmaking in 
which appellate micromanagement has less to recommend it.”  Fox v. Vice, 563 
U.S. 826, 838 (2011). 
8 As stated above, we need not specifically address each of the many 
arguments made because all but one of Appellants’ challenges were well within 
the District Court’s discretion.  We do, however, note that the Court’s total fee 
award reflected meticulous application of the Gunter/Prudential factors and the 
lodestar cross-check, and its lodestar cross-check revealed a multiplier of 2.96, 
which is within the acceptable range in this Circuit.  In re Cendant Corp. PRIDES 
Litig., 243 F.3d 722, 742 (3d Cir. 2001) (observing a range of reasonable 
multipliers from 1.35 to 2.99).  In addition, since the lodestar served only as a 
cross-check, it was within the Court’s discretion to decline to make public the 
billing records.  See Diet Drugs II, 582 F.3d at 539 (holding that the district court 
did not need to consider or make public class counsel’s individual billing records);  
Prudential, 148 F.3d at 341-42 (upholding district court’s refusal of discovery of 
time records in a percentage-of-recovery case, where lodestar is used only as a 
cross-check).  The Court also did not abuse its discretion in capping the fees for 
individually retained private attorneys at 22% given the expert testimony and 
similar cases that support such a ruling.  
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The District Court has the authority to decide how to gather attorneys’ fees 
information and make its assessment, see, e.g., In re Diet Drugs (Diet Drugs II), 
582 F.3d 524, 539 (3d Cir. 2009) (“In large cases, especially one of prodigious 
proportions like this, reliance on summaries is certainly within the discretion of 
the district court.”), and to appoint others to assist with or provide 
recommendations for calculating and allocating attorneys’ fees, In re Warfarin 
Sodium Antitrust Litig., 391 F.3d 516, 533 n.15 (3d Cir. 2004); Prudential, 148 
F.3d at 329 n.96, 330.  When a court chooses to seek input from interested 
lawyers, it of course must closely scrutinize their recommendations, In re Diet 
Drugs (Diet Drugs I), 401 F.3d 143, 173 (3d Cir. 2005) (Ambro, J., concurring), 
and, as the fiduciary of the class, it must remain the final arbiter of both the 
amount of the award and to whom it is allocated based upon the work performed 
and whether that work benefitted the class, see, e.g., In re AT & T Corp., 455 F.3d 
160, 168-69 (3d Cir. 2006); In re Rite Aid Corp. Sec. Litig., 396 F.3d 294, 308 (3d 
Cir. 2005), as amended (Feb. 25, 2005). 
Here, the District Court sought input from Seeger in making its allocation 
decision.  Given Seeger’s role as Co-Lead Class Counsel from almost the 
inception of the case through settlement and multiple appeals, the Court 
reasonably viewed him as uniquely knowledgeable about the work performed by 
all counsel and believed that he could provide a perspective about how their work 
benefitted the class.  Seeger, however, only gave the Court a recommendation.  
The Court also considered vigorous challenges to the recommendation and gave 
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all counsel an opportunity to share their views about their own contributions to the 
case.  Thus, all counsel had a chance to correct any misimpressions that they 
believed Seeger conveyed.  Armed with this information, the Court did not blindly 
accept a recommendation from a single interested counsel but rather considered 
that recommendation in light of its knowledge of the case, the work of all counsel, 
and how all counsel described their own work.9  As result, the Court conducted a 
“robust” and “thorough judicial review” of each application.  See Sullivan v. DB 
Invs., Inc., 667 F.3d 273, 329 (3d Cir. 2011) (quoting Diet Drugs II, 582 F.3d at 
537-38). 
Furthermore, at all times, the District Court understood its role as the 
ultimate decisionmaker and fulfilled its obligation to make an independent 
assessment of each fee petition.  In making allocation decisions, the Court 
considered whether the fee applicant held an “appointed leadership” role in the 
case, whether counsel was meaningfully involved throughout the litigation, 
whether counsel demonstrated “the legal acumen necessary to construct and 
defend this unique settlement,” and the “value” counsel provided “to the 
settlement negotiations and the defense of the [s]ettlement on appeal.”  JA 88.   
Given our deference to the District Court’s methodology in making its fee 
awards, In re Gen. Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Prod. Liab. Litig., 55 
 
9 The District Court’s rejection of the proposed hourly rates as unreasonable 
and its application of a blended rate is just one way it showed that Seeger did not 
have special influence over this process.     
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F.3d 768, 821 (3d Cir. 1995), that the record supports the method used, and that 
the Court acted independently in its allocation decisions, we conclude that it acted 
well within its discretion in both its fee calculation methodology and allocation 
procedure.10 
C 
 We next address the only area in which the District Court’s fee award 
requires additional attention on remand: the explanation for its award to the 
Faneca Objectors. 
In class action settlements, a court may award attorneys’ fees to prevailing 
parties, including objectors.  See Halley v. Honeywell Int’l, Inc., 861 F.3d 481, 
496 (3d Cir. 2017) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(h)); In re Cendant Corp. PRIDES 
Litig., 243 F.3d 722, 743 (3d Cir. 2001).  District courts have “broad discretion in 
 
10 Contrary to the arguments of several Appellants, the District Court’s 
allocation procedure did not offend due process, and their citation to In re 
Nineteen Appeals Arising Out of the San Juan Dupont Plaza Hotel Fire Litig., 982 
F.2d 603, 613 (1st Cir. 1992), does not further their argument.  Nineteen Appeals 
is not binding and is factually distinguishable.  There, the district court precluded 
one group of fee applicants from “rais[ing] objections or otherwise address[ing] 
the Court” at the fee allocation hearing.  Id.  In our case, all firms were permitted 
to make written submissions, and the Court heard oral argument from 
representatives of each group challenging Seeger's proposed fee allocation.   
Furthermore,  Appellants fail to recognize that in a subsequent appeal in the 
Nineteen Appeals litigation, a second due process challenge to the fee allocation 
proceedings was rejected because the district court gave all parties the chance “to 
present their case” and provided them “a meaningful opportunity to be heard.”  In 
re Thirteen Appeals Arising Out of the San Juan Dupont Plaza Hotel Fire Litig., 
56 F.3d 295, 301 (1st Cir. 1995).  Since the parties here received “a meaningful 
opportunity to be heard” and to “present their case,” due process was provided.  
Id.  
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deciding whether, and in what amount, attorneys’ fees should be awarded [to 
objectors] since [they are] in the best position to determine whether the 
participation of objectors assisted the court and enhanced the recovery.”  Cendant 
PRIDES, 243 F.3d at 743 (quoting White v. Auerbach, 500 F.2d 822, 828 (2d Cir. 
1974)).11   
To determine whether to award a fee, courts consider several factors, 
including the benefits attorneys have given to the class.  Diet Drugs II, 582 F.3d at 
541; see also In re Fine Paper Antitrust Litig., 751 F.2d 562, 583 (3d Cir. 1984) 
(instructing that a court allocating a common fund among attorneys “responsible 
for its creation” must “determine the value of each attorney’s services to the 
class”).  We review that determination for abuse of discretion, Cendent PRIDES, 
243 F.3d at 742, by looking to the district court’s reasoning, AT & T Corp., 455 
F.3d at 164 (“We require district courts ‘to clearly set forth their reasoning for fee 
awards so that we will have a sufficient basis to review for abuse of discretion.’” 
(quoting Rite Aid, 396 F.3d at 301)). 
 
11 Appellants argue that the District Court was not “in the best position to 
determine whether the participation of objectors assisted the court and enhanced 
the recovery,” Cendant PRIDES, 243 F.3d at 743 (quoting White v. Auerbach, 500 
F.2d at 828), and should have instead appointed a special master or asked a 
magistrate judge to provide a report.  We are hard-pressed to think of anyone 
better than Judge Brody in this instance to make this decision.  The Court presided 
over the case from the start and thus had a “very full picture of the roles and 
responsibilities of the different attorneys in the litigation,” JA 91, and an 
informational advantage that a special master or magistrate judge not involved in 
the case would lack.  Retaining this duty was well within the Court’s discretion.  
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 53; Gen. Motors Corp., 55 F.3d at 821. 
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Unlike its explicit fact finding and the fulsome explanations it provided for 
the other fee applicants, we cannot discern the factual basis for the District Court’s 
$350,000 award to the Faneca Objectors.  Despite recognizing that the Faneca 
Objectors “are entitled to compensation for the work they performed for the 
class,” the District Court awarded them $350,000, a 0.08 multiplier of their $4.3 
million lodestar.  JA 106.  The Court gave no explanation for how it came up with 
this amount.  Nor did it explain why it awarded the Faneca Objectors a multiplier 
less than the full amount of their lodestar or why the Faneca Objectors’ work 
warranted a multiplier far below that awarded to every other counsel.  The Court 
noted only that the Faneca Objectors’ $20 million requested fee (nearly five times 
its $4.3 million lodestar) was “unreasonable” and that $350,000 was sufficient 
“[i]n consideration of the service provided as liaison counsel and the firms’ role in 
providing benefits to the class.”  JA 106.   
Because the Court did not identify the facts that led it to reach these 
conclusions, we are unable to review it.  Therefore, we will remand for the Court 
to provide the facts that supported its fee determination.  Interfaith Cmty. Org. v. 
Honeywell Int’l, Inc., 726 F.3d 403, 416 (3d Cir. 2013) (instructing that a district 
court “must support its findings with a sufficient articulation of its rationale to 
allow for meaningful appellate review”). 
III 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm in part and remand in part with 
respect to the attorneys’ fee awarded to the Faneca Objectors. 
